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(decided July 6, 1999)
Defendant, John Martello, was convicted of one count of
attempted coercion in the first degree and one count of criminal
mischief in the second degree and was sentenced to two concurrent
terms of one and one-half to four and one-half years
imprisoitnent.2  Defendant -appealed and claimed that the
government's acquisition of evidence through electronic
wiretapping3 violated the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution4 and was contrary to the
subsequent decision reached by the Court of Appeals of New York
in People v. Bialostok.5 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decisions of both the Supreme Court of New York and its
Appellate Division holding that the court's own decision in
Bialostok must be applied prospectively only, thus making it
inapplicable to pen register6 surveillance conducted by New York
law enforcement prior to the issuance of the Bialostok ruling.7
' 1999 WL 452195 (N.Y. July 6,1999).
2 1d.
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 1999). This statute provides in
pertinent part: "Wiretapping is defined, in relevant part, as intentional
overhearing or recording of a telephonic or telegraphic communication."
4 U.S.C.A. CONST. amend. IV: The Fourth Amendment provides in pertinent
part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
' People v. Bialostok, 80 N.Y.2d 738, 742, 610 N.E.2d 374, 376, N.Y.S.2d
701, 703 (1993); The court held that a pen register device capable of being
adapted to monitor telephone conversations should be treated as an
eavesdropping device subject to a probable cause requirements of CPL 700.
6 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 705.00(1) (McKinney 1999), This statute provides
in pertinent part: "pen register is defined to mean: a device which records or
decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or
680
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In October 1993, Paul Martello, an officer of Plumber's Labor
Union No. 2, along with nine other individuals, was charged with
enterprise corruption and related crimes in a 183-count
indictment.' The charges arose out of a government investigation
into alleged labor racketeering and other illegal activities involving
-the plumbing industry.9 Throughout the investigation, orders were
granted authorizing the installation of pen registers, and ultimately
eavesdropping devices, on the personal telephones of the
individuals indicted. 0 The evidence against defendant at trial was
derived from the government's electronic telephonic
eavesdropping. The government's numerous applications for the
eavesdropping warrants were supported by information gained
from the government's prior pen register surveillance."2 That
surveillance was authorized by warrants issued pursuant to CPL
705.10.3 The surveillance was concluded before Bialostok was
decided_'
4
On appeal, the defendant, relying on Bialostok, argued that
because the pen register devices used in his case were undisputedly
capable of monitoring the contents of telephone conversations,
they must be treated as eavesdropping devices, thus, making them
subject to the probable cause requirement of CPL 700.15.'
Furthermore, since the warrants were issued upon the "reasonable
otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is
attached ... "Id.
7 Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
8 Id.
9 People v. Salzarulo, 168 Misc2d 408,409, 639 N.Y.S.2d 885, 886 (Sup. Ct.
New York County 1996).
10 Id.
11 Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
12 Id.
13 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 705.10 (McKinney 1999). This section requires a
judicial order based upon a showing of reasonable suspicion to install a pen
register. Id.
14 Id.
15 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15(2) (McKinney 1999). The statute provides
in pertinent part: "an eavesdropping warrant may be issued only upon probable
cause to believe that a particularly described person is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a particular designated offense... " Id.
2000
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suspicion" requirement of CPL 705.10, the evidence should be
suppressed.
1 6
Proper analysis of the case at bar requires a discussion of
Bialostok, upon which the appellant's contentions rest.17  In
Bialostok, the defendant was convicted of gambling and
conspiracy based, in part, on evidence derived from electronic
monitoring of two telephone lines used to transmit bets. 8 Under
the law at the time, a warrant based on probable cause was
required for an eavesdropping device, 'but none was needed to
install a pen register.19 Subsequent to Bialostok's operative facts,
on December 22, 1988, CPL article 705 became effective,2° thus
requiring a judicial order based upon a showing of reasonable
suspicion to install a pen register.2' The Court of Appeals
distinguished the pen registers used in Bialostok from traditional
pen registers' by acknowledging that the former have the
additional capacity to record conversations. 3  Relying on this
determination, the court held that a pen register device capable of
being adapted to monitor telephone conversations should be treated
as an eavesdropping device subject to the probable cause
requirement of CPL article 700.10.24
The court's analysis of the case began with a discussion of the
difference between the federal and state rules regarding
retroactivity.' In Griffith v. Kentucky 6, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that where a new constitutional rule is formed, it
16 Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
17 Id.
11 Bialostok at 743, 610 N.E.2d at 375, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
19 Id.
20 Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
21 Id.
22 Bialostok at 744, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703. ("... a pen
register was incapable of intruding on a legitimate expectation of privacy
because it recorded only phone numbers dialed and disclosed nothing more than
what phone users voluntarily conveyed to the telephone company in the ordinary
course of business").
23 Id. at 744.
24 Id. at 743.
25 Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
26 479 U.S. 314.
682 [Vol 16
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is to be applied retroactively to all cases pending on direct
review.27 Alternatively, in American Trucking Association v.
Smith28, the Supreme Court recognized that when questions of state
law are at issue, state courts have the authority to determine the
retroactivity of their own decisions.29 New York implements a
more flexible approach to retroactivity, in which it applies the
Pepper-Mitchell tripartite test.3"
The court first determined whether the present case raised a
federal or state issue of retroactivity. In making their
determination, the court noted that in interpreting CPL article 700,
it was required to be sensitive "to the constitutional guarantees
against search and seizure that the statute seeks to protect.""
Moreover, the court's analysis of the issue was limited to the
privacy protection then afforded pursuant to the provisions of
article 700 of the CPL.32 The court concluded that the issue in the
present case emanates from the court's interpretation of CPL
article 700, albeit inspired by federal constitutional principles to
some extent, 3 and thus constitutes a New York State rule of law
therefore requiring application of this State's Pepper-Mitchell
factors.'
In applying the Pepper-Mitchell factors, the threshold question
under this analysis is whether the Bialostok case itself established a
new rule of law in this State, or merely "applied previously
established principles in a new factual setting or settle[d] a
27 Id. at 328.
28 496 U.S. 167.
29 Id. at 177.
1 People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213, 220, 423 N.E2d 366, 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d
889, 996 (1981). Whether a new rule of New York State Law is to be given
retroactive effect requires an evaluation of three factors: (1) the purpose to be
served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, (3) the effect on
the administration of justice of retroactive application. See People v. Mitchell,
80 N.Y.2d 519, 525-26,606 N.E.2d 1381, 1384,591 N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (1992).
31 Bialostok at 745, 610 N.E.2d at 376, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (noting that
"[o]ur interpretation of article 700 must be sensitive to the constitutional
guarantees against search and seizure that the statute seeks to protect").
3 Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
1 People v. Martello, 251 A.D.2d 187,188,675 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1" Dept. 1998).
Martello, 1999 WL 452195.
2000 683
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question in a manner that was clearly foreshadowed."35 In People
v. Favor,3 6 the Court of Appeals recognized that the determination
that a new rule was established is warranted where a recent holding
"represented a dramatic shift away from customary and established
procedure., 37 In the case at bar, the court found that the decision in
Bialostok for the first time placed pen registers having audio
capabilities under article 700 of the New York Criminal Procedure
Law, which had previously dealt exclusively with eavesdropping
surveillance?-  By holding audib-capablepen registers subject to
the probable cause requirements of CPL article 700, the Bialostok
ruling did in fact represent a dramatic shift away from customary
and established procedure thus warranting the determination that
Bialostok established a new rule of law in New York State.39
Following its determination that Bialostok established a new
state rule of law, the court applied the Pepper-Mitchell factors.4 °
The court determined that "the purpose of the rule is unrelated to
the fact-finding process and, in that respect, in no way affects the
determination of guilt and innocence."'" In other words, the rule
does not relate to the substance of the information procured, but
simply the procedures the government uses in obtaining the
information. Moreover, the rule is intended as a deterrent to the
government's ability to engage in unauthorized electronic
eavesdropping.4 2  Additionally, the court found that the law
enforcement authorities relied extensively on CPL 705 which
required simply a "reasonable suspicion" to procure a pen register
warrant.43 Finally, the court held that in light of law enforcement's
reliance on the pre-Bialostok rule, retroactive application of the
law would work a substantial burden on the administration of
35 Id.
36 82 N.Y.2d 254, 624 N.E.2d 631, 604 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1993).
37 Id. at 263, 624 N.E.2d at 635, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 498.
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justice and could affect a large number of cases still bending." In
light of this, the court held that Bialostok should be applied
prospectively only.
Additionally, the court recognized that Bialostok was not
controlling upon the facts and circumstances of Martello because
article 705 of the CPL went into effect subsequent to Bialostok's
operative facts.4' The court reasoned that it did not refer to CPL
article 700 in its analysis of Bialostok because of its subsequent
effective date.4 Thus, in the case at bar, the court addressed for
the first time whether the Bialostok ruling should be applied in a
case where law enforcement strictly complied with the
prescriptions of CPL article 705.47
In summation, the court discussed the status of pen registers in
the statutory scheme of the CPL. In People v. Kramer,4s the court
"forewarned that [it's] opinion in Bialostok had not created a per se
rule that all pen registers with audio capability were equivalent to
eavesdropping devices.4 9 As evidence, the court points to CPL
article 705's definition of "pen register"50 in combination with CPL
article 700's definition of "eavesdropping."' The definition of
"pen register" under CPL article 705 provides no exclusion for pen





4 92 N.Y.2d 529,706 N.E.2d 731,683 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1998).
49 Id. at 541,706 N.E.2d at 743, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 755.
50 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 705.00 (McKinney 1999) (defining "pen register"
as:
A device which records or decodes electronic or other
impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise
transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is
attached, but such term does not include any device used by a
provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication
service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for
communications services provided by such provider or any
device used by a provider or customer of a wire
communication service for cost accounting or other like
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capacity.52 Additionally, the definition of "eavesdropping" in CPL
article 700 explicitly excludes "the use of a pen register or trap
and trace device when authorized pursuant to [Criminal Procedural
Law] article 705."53 In light of this, the court found that CPL
article 705's definition of "pen register" along with the express
exclusion of pen registers from CPL article 700's definition of
"eavesdropping," supports its determination that the legislature
intended to view all pen registers, including those capable of
recording qtnversations,-as -pen registers and not, as Bialostok
held, as eavesdropping devices.'
Thus, the court held that the ruling in Bialostok emanated from
its interpretation of the New York State statutory law, did not raise
constitutional concerns, and, therefore, was subject only to the
New York State rules on retroactivity. Moreover, the Pepper-
Mitchell factors applied begged the conclusion that Bialostok
should be applied prospectively only. Furthermore, the court
concluded that Bialostok was not controlling upon the case at bar
because of the subsequent effective date of CPL 705. Thus, the
Bialostok ruling was inapplicable to the case at bar. Upon further
discussion, the court held that in reference to the CPL, all "pen
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